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When a party opposes an insurer in litigation, access to the
claim file is often a critical issue. The claim file is the best and
most obvious record of both the underlying facts and the in-
surer's handling of the claim. The extent to which it is discover-
able may determine whether the case goes forward and which
party ultimately prevails. Because the claim file is so valuable,
insurers vigorously seek to protect it from discovery. Their most
effective shield is the work product doctrine.
The doctrine's primary purpose generally has been to en-
courage optimal amounts of trial preparation by guaranteeing
parties that their pretrial efforts need not be shared with the op-
position except under limited circumstances. Federal and most
state rules of civil procedure shield materials prepared "in an-
ticipation of litigation," but allow the party seeking discovery to
access such materials by demonstrating a "substantial need" for
the materials and an inability to obtain their equivalent else-
where without "undue hardship."'
Not surprisingly, the boundaries of work product protection
are not always clear. The insurance context provides unique dif-
ficulties in this regard. Because of the nature of the insurance
business, much of what an insurer does is arguably trial prepara-
tion. Insurers point out that the possibility of litigation is ever
present, and, therefore, that every claim investigation antici-
pates litigation to some extent. This position has a certain com-
mon sense appeal. Common sense also suggests, however, that if
the purpose of work product protection is to encourage pretrial
preparation, there is no reason to protect preparation that would
be done even if not protected. In many cases, much of the claim
file will fall into this category. Thus, insurance discovery dis-
putes force courts to consider how to treat materials that are ar-
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guably prepared in anticipation of litigation, but are used for
other purposes as well.
If a court determines that a document has been prepared in
"anticipation of litigation," the court may then have to consider
whether the "substantial need" exception applies. Courts dis-
agree over whether an insured's allegation that his insurer has
denied or otherwise evaluated his claim in bad faith establishes
substantial need for an otherwise protected file. A liberal discov-
ery rule may encourage frivolous allegations of bad faith, while
restricting discovery may make it difficult to prove bad faith,
leaving insurers unaccountable.
How courts treat work product questions in insurance cases
affects the nature of cases brought, which parties prevail, and
the kind of investigations insurers conduct. Despite the impor-
tant interests at stake, courts have failed to reach a consensus on
how to interpret the work product doctrine in the insurance con-
text. This Comment will examine, in the context of first party in-
surance,' how to interpret the doctrine so that trial preparation
materials are adequately protected at a minimum cost to society.
Part I summarizes the history and purposes of the work
product doctrine and discusses Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3). Part II introduces the issues involved in applying the
doctrine in insurance cases and the approaches courts have
taken to those issues. Part III examines how and when work
product protection affects the amount of trial preparation and
discusses four costs to society that may result from a court's in-
terpretation of the work product doctrine: divergence costs,
missed sharing costs, administrative costs, and side-effects costs.
Part IV uses these costs to evaluate the approaches courts have
taken in insurance cases, emphasizing the interdependence be-
tween the "anticipation of litigation" requirement and allegations
of bad faith. This Part concludes that for first party insurance
cases, the best approach presumes that portions of the claim file
prepared prior to the insurer's decision to deny a claim are not in
anticipation of litigation, and does not allow an allegation of bad
faith to satisfy the substantial need exception automatically.
2 "First party" insurance provides for the payment of benefits to the insured upon the
occurrence of specified events. Examples include life insurance, health insurance, and
disability insurance. 'Third party" insurance typically indemnifies the insured against li-
ability to third parties. See Robert E. Keeton and Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law: A Guide
to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines and Commercial Practices § 4.10(a) (West
1988).
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I. THE WORK PRODUCT DOc INE AND RULE 26(b)(3)
A. Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3)
Modern analyses of work product issues generally focus on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) or its state counterparts,
but the doctrine antedates these procedural rules. The Supreme
Court first definitively analyzed the justifications for and limits
of the work product doctrine in Hickman v Taylor,3 where the
Court denied a party's request for discovery of witness state-
ments taken by opposing counsel. According to the Court, the re-
quest was "an attempt, without purported necessity or justifica-
tion, to secure written statements, private memoranda and per-
sonal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's
counsel in the course of his legal duties."4 The Court reasoned
that such an attempt contradicted the "public policy underlying
the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims."5 Yet, even
while embracing protection of trial preparation, the Hickman
court foresaw limits to the doctrine, noting that "[w]here relevant
and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and
where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of
one's case, discovery may be properly had."6 The Court left fur-
ther development of the boundaries of the doctrine to the lower
courts.
Between the 1947 Hickman decision and 1970, courts sought
to flesh out the protection afforded by the work product doctrine.
Conflicts arose on a number of issues, including the applicability
of work product protection to preparation by nonattorneys and
the showing of need required to overcome work product protec-
tion.7 In 1970, the work product doctrine was incorporated into
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in part to resolve these con-
flicts.8 The current Rule 26(b)(3) provides that:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things otherwise discoverable.., and prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or
329 US 495 (1947).
Id at 510.
Id.
Id at 511.
See generally 4 James Win. Moore, et al, Moore's Federal Practice 26.14 at 285-91
(Matthew Bender 2d ed 1996).
' Prior to the 1970 amendments, the federal rules required "good cause" for the dis-
covery of any document. The 1970 amendments removed this general "good cause" re-
quirement, and at the same time provided for special protection for "documents and other
tangible things" that were prepared in anticipation of litigation. See Notes of Advisory
Committee on 1970 Amendments to FRCP 26(b).
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for that other party's representative (including the other
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or
agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of
the party's case and that the party is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materi-
als by other means.9
Most states now have work product provisions that are identical,
or extremely similar, to the federal rule."
Two features of the federal rule are worth noting. First, the
rule protects only "documents and tangible things."" Even if a
document is itself protected, an opposing party may still discover
the underlying facts through depositions or other discovery tech-
niques. 2 Second, to merit protection, a document must have been
prepared in "anticipation of litigation." If the document meets the
anticipation of litigation standard, the party seeking discovery
may access the document only by demonstrating a "substantial
need" for the document and "undue hardship"3 in obtaining its
substantial equivalent by other means.'
9 FRCP 26(b)(3).
0 Thirty-four states have provisions identical to 26(b)(3), ten have provisions almost
identical to 26(b)(3), while six states have provisions that differ materially from the fed-
eral rule. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 Va L Rev 1515, 1520-21
& nn 29-31 (1991) (surveying state discovery rules). In diversity cases, the federal work
product doctrine rather than the state rule applies. See Moore, et al, 4 Moore's Federal
Practice $ 26.1515] at 326-27 (cited in note 7).
" Nontangible items, while unprotected by 26(b)(3), may still be protected as work
product by Hickman and subsequent case law. See, for example, Clute v Davenport Co,
118 FED 312, 315 (D Conn 1988) ("Both Hickman v. Taylor and subsequent cases make
clear that the [work product] doctrine is not limited in its scope to discovery of documents
and other tangible items....").
"See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amendments to FRCP 26(b) (cited in
note 8); Ring v Commercial Union Insurance Co, 159 FRD 653, 657 (M D NC 1995).
"While "substantial need" and "undue hardship" are purportedly distinct, the practi-
cal difference between them is slight.
" Rule 26(b)(3) extends special protection to "opinion work product," providing that
"[iln ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made the
court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation."
Some courts have interpreted this rule to establish an absolute privilege for opinion work
product. See Duplan Corp v Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F2d 730, 734 (4th
Cir 1974) ("[N]o showing of relevance, substantial need or undue hardship should justify
compelled disclosure of an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories."). Other courts allow the discovery of opinion work product in limited instances.
For example, many courts will allow discovery of opinion work product if it is "directly at
issue." See Reavis v Metropolitan Property and Liability Insurance Co, 117 FRD 160, 164
(S D Cal 1987) (explaining that while Rule 26(b)(3) affords mental impressions "greater
protection" than non-opinion work product, mental impressions are not immune from dis-
covery). The Supreme Court has held that the usual showing of substantial need and un-
due hardship is not sufficient to obtain access to opinion work product, but has not de-
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B. Justifications for the Doctrine
Meaningful application of the work product doctrine to in-
surance cases requires an understanding of the purposes of the
doctrine itself. Four main justifications of the doctrine have been
articulated. First, the doctrine prevents attorneys from hesitat-
ing to do trial preparation." Second, work product protection
may deter attorneys from altering their preparation to avoid
having a written record of information.16 Third, allowing discov-
ery of work product could have a "demoralizing effect on the legal
profession."'7 Finally, allowing discovery of work product could
lead to a party's attorney being called as a witness.
II. RULE 26(b)(3) AND THE PROBLEM OF INSURANCE CLAIM FILES
Parties attempt to gain access to an insurer's claim file in a
variety of situations. Cases may center on disputes about cover-
age or on disputes about whether contractual responsibilities
have been carried out in good faith. Because the file will gener-
cided whether the protection is absolute. Upjohn Co v United States, 449 US 383, 401
(1981).
1" Hesitance to do preparation may be motivated by three factors: the lessened value
of preparation if it must be shared, the fear that in completely developing one's case one
might uncover potentially adverse information that the opponent is unlikely to uncover
on his own, and the possibility of obtaining the information passively by discovering it
from the other party. See D. Christopher Wells, The Attorney Work Product Doctrine and
Carry-Over Immunity: An Assessment of Their Justifications, 47 U Pitt L Rev 675, 684-85
(1986). Compare Thornburg, 77 Va L Rev at 1527 (cited in note 10) (arguing that both the
"bad facts" and "lazy lawyer" rationales are unpersuasive).
" Hickman, 329 US at 511 ("Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere
demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten."). Modern
commentators do not give much weight to this justification, however. For example, Judge
Easterbrook argues that it may be unrealistic in light of the complexity of modern litiga-
tion to think that attorneys will "stop taking notes." See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 S
Ct Rev 309, 362 (arguing that parties are likely to accommodate their behavior to the dis-
closure rules in only a limited manner).
" Hickman, 329 US at 511 ("An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not
be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the
giving of legal advice and the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profes-
sion would be demoralizing."). This justification has fallen out of vogue today. Thornburg
argues that concern for the morale and reputation of the legal profession is not compel-
ling, and even offers some lawyer jokes as support for her position. Thornburg, 77 Va L
Rev at 1539-40 & n 119 (cited in note 10).
" See Hickman, 329 US at 517 (Jackson concurring) (explaining that if an attorney
were forced to deliver to the opposition an account of what a witness told him prior to
trial, that account would inevitably diverge at least slightly from the witness's at-trial
testimony. Then, the door would be open to the adversary to call the attorney to the stand
to "impeach" the witness). Compare Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.7 ("A
lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness.").
1997] 1429
The University of Chicago Law Review
ally contain information about a claim that is the subject of the
litigation, it will often satisfy the basic relevance requirement for
discoverability i9
This threshold inquiry of relevance is not dispositive, how-
ever. In response to a plaintiff's discovery request, insurers fre-
quently seek to shield portions of the claim file from discovery by
invoking the work product doctrine. Courts therefore must decide
which parts of the claim file are protected by Rule 26(b)(3) or its
state counterparts. This Part discusses the issues courts encoun-
ter in deciding which portions of the claim file to protect, and in-
troduces the approaches courts have taken to those issues.
A. The "Anticipation of Litigation" Requirement
In seeking to determine which portions of a claim file are
protected, courts must first evaluate which parts of the file meet
the "anticipation of litigation" threshold. The cases exhibit at
least five general approaches.
First, a number of courts have limited the reach of the work
product doctrine by holding that materials prepared in the ordi-
nary course of business will not be considered to have been pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation ("ordinary course of business
exception")." For example, the court in Atlanta Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co v Transamerica Insurance Co2 refused to protect much
of the claim file because "the evaluation of claims of its policy-
holders is the regular, ordinary, and principal business" of an in-
surer.
22
'"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending action... ." FRCP 26(b)(1). In some
cases, a party may attempt to obtain discovery of files regarding claims other than the
one that is the subject of the litigation. See generally Thomas E. Workman, Plaintiffs
Right to the Claim File, Other Claim Files and Related Information: The Ticket to the
Gold Mine, 24 Tort and Ins L J 137 (1988) (arguing that discovery of other claim files
"will be the battleground of the future" and is likely to be resolved in favor of discover-
ability).
The ordinary course of business exception is not limited to the insurance context.
See Notes of Advisory Committee on the 1970 Amendments to FRCP 26(b) (cited in note
8); Binks Manufacturing Co v National Presto Industries, Inc, 709 F2d 1109, 1120 (7th Cir
1983) (party's in-house memorandum prepared in the ordinary course of business discov-
erable in a contract dispute).
2' 61 FRD 115 (N D Ga 1972).
' Id at 118. See also Baker v CNA Insurance Co, 123 FRD 322, 328 (D Mont 1988)
(explaining that "where the contested material is prepared with the primary motive of as-
sisting in a party's day to day business, the material is not protected trial preparation
even if there exists a likelihood of ultimate litigation"); Western Natl Bank v Employers
Insurance of Wausau, 105 FRD 55, 57 (D Colo 1985) (noting that insurers' "factual inves-
tigations of claims" are within the ordinary course of business exception).
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A second line of cases has interpreted the anticipation of liti-
gation requirement much more broadly, protecting even routine
investigations by insurers ("broad protection approach").23 These
courts reason that the rule requires only that the document be
prepared in anticipation of litigation, regardless of whether that
is its sole or even primary motivation. Accordingly, the broad
protection approach rejects the ordinary course of business ex-
ception: even if a document was prepared in the ordinary course
of business, it will be granted protection as long as one reason for
its preparation was anticipation of litigation.'
Third, some courts have narrowly construed the anticipation
of litigation requirement to hold that only the portions of the
claim file prepared at the direction of counsel are protected ("di-
rection of counsel rule"). This approach effectively maintains the
distinction between materials prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion and those prepared in the ordinary course of business, but
employs the use of counsel to draw the line between the two. In
the leading case of Thomas Organ Co v Jadranska Slobodna
Plovidba,25 the court held that reports that do not involve legal
expertise are conclusively presumed to be in the ordinary course
of business.26
A fourth group of decisions employs a "denial presumption."
According to this presumption, any investigation undertaken be-
fore a claim is denied is not in anticipation of litigation, while
any investigation undertaken after denial is in anticipation of
litigation.27 A party seeking discovery may overcome the denial
presumption by an appropriate showing; the exact showing re-
quired varies among courts. In Pete Rinaldi's Fast Foods, Inc v
See, for example, Almaguer v Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co, 55 FRD
147, 149 (D Neb 1972) (Statements obtained by defendant's claim agent as part of a rou-
tine accident investigation and in anticipation of a possible claim are protected by the
work product doctrine.); Ashmead v Harris, 336 NW2d 197, 200 (Iowa 1983) (Materials
prepared by an insurance company in a routine accident investigation are protected by
the work product doctrine.).
2 See Almaguer, 55 FRD at 149.
254 FRD 367 (N D IlM 1972).
Id at 372 ("[A]ny report or statement made by or to a party's agent ... which has
not been requested by nor prepared for an attorney nor which otherwise reflects the em-
ployment of an attorney's legal expertise must be conclusively presumed to have been
made in the ordinary course of business."). See also Westhemco Ltd v New Hampshire In-
surance Co, 82 FRD 702, 708 (S D NY 1979), modified on other grounds, Commercial Un-
ion Insurance Co v Albert Pipe & Supply Co, 484 F Supp 1153, 1154 (S D NY 1980).
Technically, the turning point is the time at which the insurer reaches a decision on
a claim, whether or not that decision is a "denial." Naturally, litigated cases generally in-
volve at least a partial denial, such as a decision by the insurer to pay a smaller amount
than the insured believes he is owed. See Moore, et al, 4 Moore's Federal Practice 26.14
at 294-99 (cited in note 7).
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Great American Insurance Companies,28 the court held that to
overcome the presumption and win protection for documents
prepared prior to the denial of the claim, the insurer must pres-
ent "specific evidentiary proof of objective facts demonstrating a
resolve to litigate" prior to denial.2 1 In Harper v Auto-Owners In-
surance Co,30 the court made the presumption even more difficult
to overcome by requiring proof that "at the time of the prepara-
tion there was a reasonable anticipation of litigation and that the
document was prepared solely for litigation."
Finally, many courts decline to fashion any kind of rule spe-
cific to the discoverability of claim files. Instead, they rely on a
general understanding of what "anticipation of litigation" means
and start from scratch with each new insurance case to deter-
mine how the facts accord with that understanding ("ad hoc ap-
proach"). These courts examine the facts of each case to deter-
mine "whether in light of the factual context 'the document can
fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the
prospect of litigation.'"3 Some courts indicate that the real issue
is whether litigation was the "primary motivating purpose" be-
hind the creation of a document. Other courts focus on when the
prospect of litigation became "substantial" or "identifiable," "
which depends on the nature of the claim and investigation.
" 123 FRD 198 (M D NC 1988).
Id at 202-03 (holding that the insurer failed to show a resolve to litigate prior to de-
nying the insured's claim, and thus is not entitled to work product protection).
138 FRD 655, 663-64 (S D Ind 1991).
Logan v Commercial Union Insurance Co, 96 F3d 971, 976 (7th Cir 1996), citing
Binks Manufacturing Co v National Presto Industries, Inc, 709 F2d 1109, 1119 (7th Cir
1983) (internal citations omitted). See also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and
Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2024 at 338-39 (West 2d ed
1994) (explaining that since the 1970 amendments to Rule 26(b)(3), courts have generally
looked at the particular facts present when determining if material was prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation).
' See Stout v Illinois Farmers Insurance Co, 150 FRD 594, 601 (S D Ind 1993) (col-
lecting cases); United States v Davis, 636 F2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir 1981).
' Travelers Indemnity Co v Allied-Signal, Inc, 124 FRD 101, 102 (D Md 1989). See
also Carver v Allstate Insurance Co, 94 FRD 131, 134-35 (S D Ga 1982) (holding that a
substantial prospect of litigation was indicated by referral of the insured's fire loss claim
to a senior representative). The "primary purpose" and "substantial prospect" formula-
tions are merely two common examples of ad hoc, fact-intensive approaches. This Com-
ment will use these examples as representatives of the ad hoc approach in the later
analysis, because evaluation of a general ad hoc approach is difficult. For an endorsement
of other fact-intensive approaches, see Brian Woodward, Note, Work Product Discovery in
Insurance Litigation, 18 Ind L Rev 547, 559 (1985); Robert H. Oberbillig, Note, Work
Product Discovery: A Multifactor Approach to the Anticipation of Litigation Requirement
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), 66 Iowa L Rev 1277, 1297 (1981).
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B. Bad Faith and the Substantial Need and Undue
Hardship Question
Once a court determines that a document was prepared in
anticipation of litigation, it must then decide whether the sub-
stantial need and undue hardship exception is satisfied. A party
may attempt to establish substantial need in a variety of ways.3
One important pattern in insurance cases involves an insured
arguing that his allegation that the insurer acted in bad faith es-
tablishes substantial need.35 Some courts agree that an allegation
of bad faith alone constitutes substantial need because, for such
a claim, the insurer's processing of the claim is critical, and the
insured has no way of discovering how the claim was handled
without access to the claim file.36 These courts argue that deny-
'For example, one well established line of cases finds substantial need and undue
hardship when the claim file contains witness statements taken at the time of an acci-
dent. See, for example, Galambus v Consolidated Freightways Corp, 64 FRD 468, 473 (D
Ind 1974) (explaining that the "liberal policy" in favor of production of witness statements
taken contemporaneously with the accident is justified because (1) the witness's memory
is fresh at the time the statement is taken, and (2) the party seeking discovery may have
been injured at the time of the accident and thus unable to investigate on his own at that
time). See also Suggs v Whitaker, 152 FRD 501, 509 (M D NC 1993) (allowing discovery of
contemporaneous statements to insurer); Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amend-
ments to FRCP 26(b) (cited in note 8) (explaining that documents are likely to be discov-
erable when the witness has "given a fresh and contemporaneous account in a written
statement while he is available to the party seeking discovery only a substantial time
thereafter").
"Most states recognize a cause of action by an insured for a bad faith breach by his
insurer. Allegations of bad faith against a first party insurer generally involve the denial
of a claim. Bad faith may exist in situations where the insurer "denies liability knowing
there is no rational principled basis for doing so." Logan, 96 F3d at 981, citing Erie Insur-
ance Co v Hickman, 622 NE2d 515, 520 (Ind 1993) (internal citations omitted). Compare
Polselli v Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co, 23 F3d 747, 751 (3d Cir 1994) (holding
bad faith is "any frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay the proceeds of the policy"). Allega-
tions of bad faith against a third party insurer, by contrast, often assert that the insurer
has acted in bad faith by failing to defend a case against the insured adequately, or by re-
fusing to accept a settlement offer that is advantageous to the insured. In the paradigm
situation, the insurer refuses a settlement offer within the policy limits, and the ultimate
liability turns out to be greater than the policy limits, leaving the insured personally li-
able for the excess. Where the original settlement offer is near the limits of the policy, the
insurer may have little downside in refusing and seeing if it can do better; the insured
bears the entire downside. See generally Lee R. Benton and G. David Johnston, Note, The
Tort of Bad Faith: A Perspective Look at the Insurer's Expanding Liability, 8 Cumb L Rev
241 (1977).
See, for example, Hall v Goodwin, 775 P2d 291, 296 (Okla 1989) (explaining that
absent discovery of the claim files, there is no other way to determine the basis upon
which the insurer made its decision to deny the claim); Silva v Fire Ins Exchange, 112
FRD 699, 699 (D Mont 1986) (same). If the substantial need and undue hardship excep-
tion is met in an insurance case, the court may need to consider how to "protect" opinion
work product. See note 14 and accompanying text. In witness statement cases, see note
34, this protection often involves the deletion of opinion work product-such as evaluative
comments--from the witness statements before discovery is allowed. See Notes of Advi-
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ing access to the file in such cases could discourage allegations of
bad faith, leaving insurers unaccountable. Other courts give less
weight to a claim of bad faith, requiring some further showing of
need to access materials insurers have prepared in anticipation
of litigation." These courts fear that insureds may have an incen-
tive to add allegations of bad faith to their complaints if doing so
affords potential discovery advantages.38
The extent to which an allegation of bad faith establishes
substantial need and undue hardship necessarily depends on
what is otherwise protected. If most of the claim file is protected
as in anticipation of litigation, substantial need to override that
protection may occur relatively frequently because the insured
will not otherwise have access to information necessary to make
out the allegation of bad faith. But if only a few parts of the claim
file are deemed in anticipation of litigation, a party seeking dis-
covery should have more difficulty establishing a substantial
need to obtain those few protected parts.
sory Committee on 1970 Amendments to FRCP 26(b) (cited in note 8) (explaining that
courts will often find it necessary to order disclosure of a document with the mental im-
pressions and subjective evaluations of lawyers, investigators, and claim agents deleted).
Protecting opinion work product is a difficult issue when an allegation of bad faith is in-
volved. Where an insured claiming bad faith has established substantial need for the
claim file, the need is probably most substantial not for documents that contain facts
about the underlying claim, but for documents that reveal how the insurer acted in han-
dling the claim--documents that courts are particularly likely to consider opinion work
product. Such cases put the "at issue" exception to the test, requiring courts to consider
whether putting an insurer's behavior at issue by alleging bad faith circumvents the spe-
cial protection of opinion work product. See note 14; Holmgren v State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co, 976 F2d 573, 577 (9th Cir 1992) ("In a bad faith insurance
claim settlement case, the 'strategy, mental impressions and opinions of [the insurer's]
agents concerning the handling of the claim are directly at issue."), quoting Reavis v Met-
ropolitan Property and Liability Insurance Co, 117 FRD 160, 164 (S D Cal 1987). Some
courts that allow an allegation of bad faith to establish substantial need also allow access
to opinion work product, arguing that opinion work product is put directly at issue by the
allegation of bad faith. See Reavis, 117 FRD at 164-65 (allowing discovery of claim files
containing insurer's mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, and legal theories).
See, for example, Logan, 96 F3d at 977 ("[A] naked claim of bad faith cannot, with-
out more, authorize a fishing expedition.... The plaintiff must demonstrate some likeli-
hood or probability that the documents sought may contain evidence of bad faith."); Clo-
sterman v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co, 1995 US Dist LEXS 11356, *3 (E D Pa) ("[T]he
mere allegation of bad faith does not entitle a plaintiff to work-product materials.").
' Some courts that find "substantial need" satisfied by an allegation of bad faith seek
to protect such allegations from being strategically included by bifurcating or severing
them from the remainder of the case, hence attempting to limit the usefulness of the ad-
ditional discovery the allegation of bad faith allowed. See, for example, In re Bergeson,
112 FRD 692, 697 (D Mont 1986); Corrente v Fitchburg Mutual Fire Insurance Co, 557
A2d 859, 860 (RI 1989). But see Ring v Commercial Union Insurance Co, 159 FRD at 653,
658 (M D NC 1995) (disfavoring bifurcation). See also Kevin M. LaCroix, Trial Bifurca-
tion Provides Important Benefits to Insurers, 7 Inside Litig 15 (Ot 1993) (explaining the
advantages to an insurer of bifurcation in "bad faith" litigation).
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III. FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN APPLYING THE DocTRINE
AND FOUR ASSOCIATED COSTS
This Part examines how the work product doctrine affects
incentives for a party to do the socially optimal amount of pre-
trial preparation. It examines the value of an additional unit of
preparation to the party and to society and discusses how the
work product doctrine aligns those two interests. It then dis-
cusses four social costs that the work product doctrine may gen-
erate: divergence costs, missed sharing costs, administrative
costs, and side effects costs.
A. How the Work Product Doctrine Affects Incentives
for Preparation
1. The divergence of the value of preparation to society and
to the litigant.
A litigant's incentives to undertake pretrial preparation do
not necessarily give rise to an optimal level of preparation from
society's point of view. 9 There are several reasons why such a di-
vergence might occur. First, a party will undervalue preparation
that may reveal information that would benefit his opponent as
well as himself and will accordingly do less preparation than so-
ciety would prefer." Second, a party might do too little (or too
much) pretrial preparation because the precedential value of the
case is more (or less) important to him than to society generally.4'
Finally, a party might do more preparation than is socially opti-
A similar disparity exists with respect to the socially desirable amount of litigation.
See generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the
Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26(2) (pt 2) J Legal Stud 575 (1997).
4 While information benefiting both parties could have social value in contributing to
the "truth-seeking" function of litigation, the litigant.will not value information that may
help his adversary. Allen, et al, argue that most litigation involves this sort of "joint pro-
duction." They further theorize that it is in such situations that courts have been most
willing to extend work product protection because absent protection the attorney is un-
likely to undertake the pretrial investigation. Ronald J. Allen, et al, A Positive Theory of
the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J Legal Stud 359, 385-86
(1990).
4 See Easterbrook, 1981 S Ct Rev at 359-61 (cited in note 16) (arguing that society's
interest in the creation of information in litigation is primarily to further "rule-creation"
and "rule-enforcement," while the motivation of many litigants focuses on the individual
case). But see Thornburg, 77 Va L Rev at 1562 (cited in note 10) (arguing that repeat
players have an incentive to "spend" an amount of money disproportionate to the value of
a particular lawsuit because they stand to gain in future lawsuits from the rules made in
the first suit).
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mal because he overvalues the "stakes-dividing" function of liti-
gation-a function that has a relatively low social value.42
2. When a litigant will do an additional unit of preparation.
A hypothetical litigant, A, will do an additional unit of
preparation whenever the expected net benefit to A of doing the
work is positive. The expected net benefit to A is the difference
between the expected value of the additional information to A
and the expected present cost to A of doing the work. The net
benefit also reflects any value A expects his opponent, B, to re-
ceive from A's preparation, as well as the value of A's lost oppor-
tunity to wait and see if B will do the preparation first and be
forced to share the results with A.
Accordingly, the likelihood that a court will order A to turn
over certain trial preparation materials during discovery affects
A's expected net benefit. If A expects the court to adopt a no
sharing rule, the expected value of preparation to A generally in-
creases. This increase is attributable to three factors. First, in-
formation may be more valuable to a party if the opposition does
not have it.' Second, with no sharing, A's lost opportunity to
wait and see if B will do the preparation and be forced to share
with A is of little value." Third, A's expectation that his prepara-
tion will not have to be shared means that the expected value to
B of A's preparation will be small.'
In contrast, if A expects a sharing rule, A's expected net
benefit from his preparation may decrease. First, if A expects to
have to share, he may expect that B's case will be strengthened
by the availability of A's work product. Second, A may believe
that he will be able to get the desired information "for free" from
B without doing the preparation himself. Under these circum-
stances, undertaking preparation may have a significant oppor-
tunity cost for A.
Given that A's expectation as to whether he must share his
preparation may impact A's net expected benefit, the anticipated
discovery rule may determine whether A does an additional unit
See Easterbrook, 1981 S Ct Rev at 359-60 (cited in note 16) ("The enterprise of liti-
gation usually is principally a fight over spilt milk.").
"This increment has been referred to as a "secrecy value." See Thornburg, 77 Va L
Rev at 1547 (cited in note 10).
"This conclusion assumes that the court will also apply the "no sharing" rule if B
does the preparation.
"Even if the trial preparation materials cannot be accessed directly, B may still de-
rive some benefit from A's preparation because of the ability to discover the facts revealed
by the preparation via depositions. See note 12 and accompanying text.
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of preparation. Two distinct scenarios are possible. In the first
scenario, A will not do the work if he expects to have to share his
preparation with B, but A will do the work if he expects his
preparation to be protected. In the second scenario, A will not do
the work if he expects not having to share the preparation, but
will do the work if he expects that the preparation will be shared.
It is a fundamental assumption of the work product doctrine that
the former situation is the norm: the work will be more valuable
to A if he does not have to share it.
46
In some situations, however, the expected rule will not de-
cide whether the preparation gets done. A will do some prepara-
tion regardless of what discovery rule he expects. This prepara-
tion will increase A's expected net benefit whether or not the
work will have to be shared. Conversely, A will decline to under-
take some preparation regardless of the expected discovery rule.
Whether or not A expects sharing, such preparation will not in-
crease A's expected net benefit.
3. When society wants an additional unit of preparation.
Society wants A to do an additional unit of preparation when
the net expected benefit to society is positive. Whether this bene-
fit is positive reflects a number of factors. One important factor is
whether society expects the preparation to produce information
that will contribute to the accurate resolution of the case." How-
ever, some preparation expected to lead to accurate resolution of
the case may be undesirable for other reasons. For example, soci-
ety may not benefit if the preparation leads to an undesirable
one-sidedness of information, produces delay, or is expensive to
carry out.
48
The value of A's preparation to society varies depending on
the perceived likelihood that a court will force A and B to share
their preparation during discovery. If the litigants expect a no
sharing rule, they may each prepare the same work independ-
ently, resulting in wasteful costs due to duplication. Although the
duplicated efforts may enhance the strength of the litigants'
cases, duplication does not enhance truth-seeking or important
precedent-setting, and thus is not socially beneficial.49 Further,
While this assumption accords with our intuition in most situations, there will be
settings where it may not hold. We will see one such setting in Part IV.
" See generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic
Analysis, 23 J Legal Stud 307 (1994).
SA's expenses may be passed on to society in ways that cause distributional con-
cerns.
"Concerns regarding duplication might be mitigated if there is a likelihood of bar-
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society might prefer that B do the work instead of A if B can do
the preparation better or at a lesser cost.
4. Work product protection as a tool for aligning the
litigant's incentives for preparation with society's desires.
Given that an individual's benefit from pretrial preparation
may diverge from society's, courts should apply the work product
doctrine to encourage A to do an additional unit of work when so-
ciety wants A to do so and to maximize the benefit that society
receives from each unit of preparation that A does. As noted
above, preparation can be grouped into three categories: prepara-
tion A will not do regardless of the sharing rule, preparation A
will do regardless of the sharing rule, and preparation for which
the choice of sharing rule will determine whether A does the
work.
In the first and second situations, the choice of discovery rule
has no effect on behavior. Whether a "sharing" or "no sharing"
rule applies, A will not do the preparation in the first situation
and will do the preparation in the second situation. In the second
situation, however, the expected discovery rule will affect the
value of A's work to society. Because A will do the work in any
case, society benefits most from a discovery rule that maximizes
the value of A's work to society. If A must share his work with B,
society will benefit because, all else equal, sharing of information
has a positive value to society. Accordingly, under circumstances
where A will do the preparation regardless of the expected dis-
covery rule, courts should adopt a sharing rule.
In the third category, where A's decision to do an additional
unit of preparation turns on the expected discovery rule, the
choice of rule is critical. As noted above, the usual assumption is
that A will do the work if he expects a no sharing rule but not if
he expects a sharing rule.5 ° If the usual assumption holds, soci-
ety's choices in this third category are to encourage A to do the
work by implementing a "no sharing" rule, or to encourage A not
to do the work by implementing a sharing rule. No rule will lead
A to do the work and share it. A will do the work and share only
if he incorrectly expected that the rule would be "no sharing."5
gained-for sharing arrangements between the litigants.
See note 46 and accompanying text.
51 Thus, use of a sharing rule to avoid "duplication" may not have the desired effect. If
the choice of rule determines whether the litigant does the work, duplication is avoided
only by avoiding the preparation altogether. Conversely, a "no sharing" rule will not nec-
essarily lead to duplication. Parties are free to negotiate reciprocal sharing arrangements
to avoid duplication. Such arrangements are most likely to occur where each party has in-
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Determining which of the two available options is preferable may
be difficult, as the decision requires an advance determination
whether "not doing" or "doing but not having to share" would be
preferable to society. 2
B. Costs to Consider in Applying the Doctrine
1. Four types of costs.
Society should interpret the work product doctrine to bring
A's incentives for preparation in line with society's desires, and
to achieve maximum utility from any preparation done. In de-
vising the most efficient application of the doctrine, courts must
consider four possible social costs: "divergence" costs, "missed
sharing" costs, "administrative" costs, and "side effects" costs.
The best approach will minimize the aggregate of these costs.
Divergence costs arise when a rule fails to eliminate the di-
vergence between the litigant's and society's preferences and
thus does not achieve the optimal amount of preparation. Diver-
gence costs often result when a sharing requirement discourages
socially valuable preparation. Similarly, a rule's failure to make
optimal use of completed preparation may be costly. Where
preparation would be done even if it will have to be shared, the
work product doctrine should require sharing. Failure to do so
leads to "missed sharing" costs.
Even a rule that effectively encourages the socially optimal
amount of work and the optimal use of work that is done may be
undesirable due to concerns about administrative costs and side
effects. Administrative costs arise when courts must undertake
time-consuming factual evaluations to apply the rule. Conse-
quently, society may adjust its preferred amount of preparation
in order to avoid these high costs of administration. In addition,
an otherwise desirable rule might generate costly side effects, in-
cluding discord with other areas of the law, or undesirable be-
havior by potential litigants in seeking to conform to the rule. 3
formation attractive to the other side.
' In situations where the "usual" assumption does not hold, society faces a different
choice. There, a "no sharing" rule will discourage preparation, and a sharing rule will en-
courage it. We will encounter a situation in Part IV where the usual assumption may not
hold.
Litigant behavior is undesirable if it generates unnecessary costs. Examples in-
clude unnecessary involvement of legal staff or inefficient claims processing procedures.
If such "undesirable" strategies for conforming to the rule are effective, they may reduce
the degree to which litigants' incentives for preparation accord with societal desires. In
addition to increasing divergence costs, such strategies may involve behavior that is in-
dependently socially undesirable, and that society would want to discourage in its own
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2. Rule 26(b)(3) as a mechanism to avoid these costs.
Courts facing work product questions are not free to start
with a clean slate and come up with a rule that minimizes the
four costs. Courts must proceed in the context of Rule 26(b)(3) or
a state counterpart. However, Rule 26(b)(3) may operate as a
rough mechanism for producing sharing or no sharing in ways
that tend to limit divergence costs and missed sharing costs. How
well the Rule accomplishes this goal, and how well it avoids ad-
ministrative costs and side effects in so doing, depends on how
courts interpret the Rule in specific contexts. An understanding
of the potential costs involved may allow courts to apply the work
product doctrine in the most beneficial way.
The "anticipation of litigation" requirement may be viewed
as an imprecise measure of whether the amount of preparation is
likely to depend on the expected sharing rule. If a document is
deemed not to have been prepared in anticipation of litigation,
the presumption is that it would be prepared regardless of the in-
terpretation of the work product doctrine. Protection is thus un-
necessary, and a sharing rule is appropriate to avoid missed
sharing costs. In contrast, when the document is deemed to have
been prepared in anticipation of litigation, the presumption is
that the nature of the sharing rule will determine whether the
document is prepared. Hence, society should implement the rule
purposively to encourage or discourage preparation as desired.
Society does so by imposing a no sharing rule that allows over-
ride by a demonstration of substantial need and undue hardship.
The "substantial need" exception may thus provide a mecha-
nism, albeit imperfect, by which courts can purposively encour-
age or discourage preparation in situations where the rule mat-
ters.' The substantial need exception may also function as a cor-
right. Hence, there are side effects costs.
The special treatment of opinion work product is another mechanism that encour-
ages preparation for which the sharing rule is likely to matter. Rule 26(b)(3) adopts a no
sharing rule for most or all opinion work product. This rule is consistent with a judgment
that the sharing/no sharing rule will often determine whether such preparation gets
done. Assuming the rule matters, society might prefer that opinion work product be done
even if not shared because it has "high value added" from a societal standpoint in terms
of achieving an accurate result. To encourage the socially beneficial, precedent-creating
function of litigation over the stakes-dividing function, Judge Easterbrook has suggested
that the work product doctrine should encourage the creation of "productive or planning
information" versus the application of existing information to the facts of the case. Opin-
ion work product, such as crafting of strategy, may constitute such "productive or plan-
ning" activity. Easterbrook, 1981 S Ct Rev at 361 (cited in note 16). In addition, there is
little reason to require sharing of opinion work product to avoid duplication: evaluations
and analyses are much less likely to be duplicative than factual investigations. Likewise,
society is unlikely to wish to discourage A's preparation of opinion work product because
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rection for the fact that the "anticipation of litigation" require-
ment does not perfectly identify and require sharing of docu-
ments for which the rule does not matter."
IV. CHOOSING RULES FOR CLAIM FILES: MINIMIZING COSTS WITH
THE DENIAL PRESUMPTION
This Part evaluates the approaches courts have used in in-
terpreting the work product doctrine in the insurance context ac-
cording to the four costs discussed above. 6 There are five com-
mon approaches: (1) the ordinary course of business exception;
(2) the broad protection approach; (3) the direction of counsel
rule; (4) the denial presumption; and (5) the ad hoc approach.57
As stated above, the optimal approach will minimize divergence
costs by giving insurers incentives to do the optimal amount of
preparation, minimize missed sharing costs by insuring maxi-
mum utility from preparation that is done, minimize administra-
tive costs, and minimize side effects.
In evaluating how judicial approaches fare in terms of the
above costs, adequate attention must be given to the bad faith is-
sue. The optimal approach to the anticipation of litigation
threshold may depend on the rule governing claims of bad faith,
and the optimal approach to the bad faith issue may depend on
the chosen anticipation of litigation rule. The analysis will reveal
that for cases involving first party insurance, the best approach
utilizes a denial presumption, accompanied by a rule that an al-
legation of bad faith does not automatically establish substantial
need.
B could do it better.
' This role of the substantial need exception is well illustrated by cases allowing dis-
covery of contemporaneous witness statements. See note 34. Because of the value of such
statements, they are likely to be taken regardless of whether the insurer expected that
they would have to be shared if litigation ensued. Hence to avoid missed sharing costs, a
sharing rule is appropriate. Yet in many cases, such documents will be deemed to have
been prepared in anticipation of litigation, and hence protected. The substantial need ex-
ception is a second chance to reach the "correct" result: a sharing rule.
The substantial need exception performs this corrective role imperfectly because the
factors relevant to the substantial need determination may differ from those relevant to
whether a litigant does a certain amount of preparation. For example, when an insurer
decides whether to undertake certain preparation, he will consider whether the work
product doctrine protects such preparation and whether the preparation is valuable even
if unprotected. By contrast, substantial need depends not only on the nature of the prepa-
ration, but also on the circumstances of the particular plaintiff; which the insurer may
not know when it is making decisions about preparation.
See Part -.B.1.
See Part l.A.
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A. Divergence Costs
As Part III demonstrated, divergence costs arise when courts
interpret the work product doctrine in a manner that leads to an
amount of preparation not in accordance with what society
wants. This situation usually arises where a sharing requirement
discourages valuable preparation."5 In particular, divergence
costs are likely to occur when a court imposes a blanket sharing
requirement under circumstances in which litigants' preparation
efforts are sensitive to the sharing rule.
The denial presumption approach performs relatively well in
terms of divergence costs. The denial presumption holds that any
material prepared by the insurer prior to the insurer's denial of
the contested claim is not protected by the work product doc-
trine.59 As long as the unprotected pre-denial preparation would
have been undertaken by the insurer regardless of the expected
discovery rule, this lack of protection will not discourage the
preparation; hence, divergence costs are avoided. If, however,
litigation is contemplated well before denial, a discovery rule
that forces the insurer to turn over documents prepared prior to
denial may discourage pre-denial preparation."0 Under these cir-
cumstances, the denial presumption may lead to divergence
costs.6
' The court in Stout v Illinois Farmers Insurance Co pointed out that the "prepara-
tion" the work product doctrine intends to encourage is trial preparation, not the insur-
ers' preparation of claim files generally. The court concluded that denouncing an inter-
pretation of the rule because it leads to poor quality claims processing is inappropriate.
150 FRD 594, 603 (S D Ind 1993).
While technically correct, this observation may have little consequence because of
the overlap between claims processing and trial preparation. Encouraging good trial
preparation in insurance cases is closely related to encouraging good investigation of
claims. Nonetheless, the point is well taken that the work product doctrine is not in-
tended to serve as a vehicle for achieving general insurance reform.
See notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
This situation often occurs in cases in which insurers know there is a high risk of
litigation. See, for example, Raso v CMC Equipment Rental, Inc, 154 FRD 126, 128-29 (E
D Pa 1994) (holding that an investigation undertaken by an insurer of a catastrophic
crane accident was in anticipation of litigation, even though the injured party had yet to
file a claim); Ring v Commercial Union Insurance Co, 159 FRD 653, 656-57 (M D NC
1995) (holding that an investigation undertaken by an insurer following a suspected ar-
son was in anticipation of litigation, even though the insurer had yet to deny the claim).
Applying the denial presumption in these cases would have resulted in forced sharing. If
the insurer chose to forego preparation rather than share, forced sharing might have
caused divergence costs. However, insurers are likely to investigate carefully most seri-
ous accidents regardless of the sharing rule, so that requiring sharing will produce only
modest divergence costs, while affording protection (as in Raso and Ring) could lead to
substantial missed sharing costs.
" The fear of an allegation of bad faith by the insured may mitigate the insurer's ten-
dency to forego such preparation, however, thus reducing concerns about divergence
costs. See Part IV.E.
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Other approaches yield divergence costs comparable to that
of the denial presumption. Under the primary purpose formula-
tion of the ad hoc approach, courts hold that materials are dis-
coverable so long as the primary purpose of their preparation
was not litigation. Even when litigation was a secondary pur-
pose, this approach requires the insurer to turn over its materi-
als. However, the expected sharing rule may determine whether
preparation is done even though litigation is only a secondary
purpose. By requiring sharing in situations where the rule may
be decisive, this formulation may discourage valuable prepara-
tion, giving rise to divergence costs.
The direction of counsel approach encounters similar diffi-
culties. It is quite conceivable that the preparation efforts of
nonlegal personnel may be sensitive to the sharing rule they ex-
pect to face at trial. For example, nonlegal personnel might con-
tinue to supervise the claim investigation well after litigation be-
comes likely, and the discovery treatment they expect may ac-
cordingly influence the nature and scope of their investigation.
Imposing a sharing rule because of lack of counsel involvement
may discourage such preparation, giving rise to divergence
costs.62
The ordinary course of business exception may also lead to
divergence costs. For insurers, unlike many businesses, ordinary
business includes the possibility of litigation." Many of the
documents that the ordinary course of business exception would
require to be shared are documents which an insurer might not
create if it expects a sharing rule. Fear that a sharing rule might
be imposed in potential litigation could discourage the prepara-
tion of such documents, giving rise to divergence costs.
Only two approaches give rise to lower divergence costs than
does the denial presumption approach: the broad protection rule
and the "substantial prospect of litigation" formulation of the ad
hoc approach. Under the broad protection rule, sharing is rarely
From the text of Rule 26(b)(3) alone, it is difficult to argue that such costs are un-
avoidable. "Anticipation of litigation" does not explicitly require the direction of counsel.
In fact, the rule's express inclusion of documents prepared by non-counsel makes the re-
introduction of direction of counsel as a necessary component of "anticipation of litiga-
tion" in insurance cases rather awkward. See Spaulding v Denton, 68 FRD 342, 345 (D
Del 1975) (explaining that Rule 26(b) gives "nonlawyers equal status with lawyers for the
purpose of'in anticipation of litigation").
' Some courts and commentators have recognized this characteristic of insurers. See,
for example, United States v AT & T, 86 FRD 603, 628 (D DC 1979) ("For many organiza-
tions, litigation is an integral part of their business, for example liability insurance com-
panies... ."); Robert D. Stokes, Note, Discovering Investigative Reports Under the Work
Product Doctrine, 34 Baylor L Rev 156, 165 (1982) (noting that for insurance companies,
the ordinary course of business entails constant preparation for litigation).
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required. Consequently, preparation is not discouraged and di-
vergence costs are correspondingly low. Similarly, most cases
that do not involve a substantial prospect of litigation, the shar-
ing rule is unlikely to determine an insurer's degree of prepara-
tion." Requiring sharing in such instances is therefore unlikely
to discourage a significant amount of preparation, keeping diver-
gence costs low.
B. Missed Sharing Costs
As Part III discussed, missed sharing costs arise when a
court's application of the work product doctrine fails to force
sharing of documents under circumstances where requiring
sharing would not discourage preparation. 5
Both the denial presumption approach and the ordinary
course of business exception approach give rise to low missed
sharing costs. The denial presumption provides for "no sharing"
only for preparation done after coverage is denied. The main
purpose of postdenial preparation is readying for litigation, how-
ever. To require sharing could well discourage such preparation,
so there is little missed sharing.
The ordinary course of business exception approach also
yields low missed sharing costs. Under this approach, a court will
deem much of the claim file to be created in the ordinary course
of business. Accordingly, the court will require that much of the
file be shared; hence there will be little missed sharing.
The other approaches give rise to greater missed sharing
costs. Under the direction of counsel approach, no sharing is re-
quired for documents prepared at the direction of counsel. There
will inevitably be some documents prepared at the direction of
counsel, however, that would be prepared regardless of the
sharing rule. Unnecessarily protecting these documents yields
missed sharing costs.
The primary purpose formulation of the ad hoc approach also
creates missed sharing costs. Under this approach, courts require
that work product be shared unless the primary purpose of the
This generalization does not deny that this sharing rule will have some impact on
insurer behavior before there is a substantial prospect of litigation. Even if litigation is
not contemplated with regard to a given claim, the sharing rule may have a structural
impact on the processing of that claim via general procedures adopted in light of past in-
terpretations of the work product doctrine in similar cases. If the stakes of the case are
high enough, the mere fear of litigation may make the discovery rules important to the
insurers' behavior regardless of how likely such litigation is to occur.
' Missed sharing costs in insurance cases are unlikely to be reduced by negotiated
sharing agreements. An individual opposing an insurance company will have little in the
way of "documents or tangible things" for which the insurer is willing to bargain.
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work was to prepare for litigation. Although the choice of sharing
rule will often affect whether a document whose primary purpose
is litigation gets created, some of this preparation will be so criti-
cal to the insurer that the insurer will do it regardless of the ex-
pected sharing rule. By failing to require sharing of such docu-
ments, this approach gives rise to missed sharing costs.
Missed sharing costs are even higher for the substantial
prospect of litigation formulation of the ad hoc approach. Under
this approach, courts require an insurer to share the claim file
unless there was a substantial prospect of litigation. For some
claims, there may be a substantial prospect of litigation from the
outset, but the insurer would undertake some sort of investiga-
tion regardless of the expected sharing rule.6" Hence, the sub-
stantial prospect approach will fail to require sharing when
sharing is possible, leading to high missed sharing costs.
Finally, the broad protection approach yields the highest
missed sharing costs. Protecting almost all of the file from shar-
ing inevitably results in extensive missed sharing. Work product
protection is intended for the sort of documents that might cease
to be generated if not protected. Certainly, there will be many
documents that would be prepared regardless of the expected in-
terpretation of the work product doctrine; thus, broad protection
creates very high missed sharing costs."
C. Administrative Costs
Administrative costs for the denial presumption approach
are low. Applying the denial presumption rule simply requires a
court to determine when a claim was denied, and protect all work
done thereafter. Courts are unlikely to have a difficult time de-
ciding the point at which coverage is denied; thus, administrative
costs are limited.68
"Carver's holding that a substantial prospect of litigation began when the claim was
referred to senior personnel leaves much room for error in this regard. See note 33;
Carver, 94 FRD at 134-35. After referral to senior personnel, much of the investigation
may still be fairly routine, and may be carried out regardless of the expected discovery
treatment.
The "anticipation of litigation" language surely does not make this reading un-
avoidable. In an age when the possibility of litigation often may be at the back of many
minds, arguing that "anticipation of litigation" includes any possibility of litigation may
lead to the conclusion that every document in every case (not just insurance cases) is pro-
tected.
"But see Harper, 138 FRD at 665, where the insurer argued that a claim was "de-
nied" when the insurer's decision was recorded rather than when the decision was con-
veyed to the insured.
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The broad protection rule also yields low administrative
costs, because basically everything in the claim file is protected.
Courts utilizing this approach could handle discovery requests
pertaining to the claim fie easily and without incurring signifi-
cant administrative costs: they would deny most such requests
out-of-hand. 9
The "direction of counsel" approach and the "ordinary course
of business" approach may involve higher administrative costs.
The direction of counsel rule, although sounding like a bright line
rule, is not as simple as one might imagine. Courts will have to
resolve the question of just how much involvement of counsel is
enough to afford protection, giving rise to administrative costs. °
For the ordinary course of business approach, administrative
costs will be low if most or all of the claim file is habitually
deemed to have been prepared in the ordinary course of business.
If a court undertakes a more individualized inquiry, however,
administrative costs will increase.7'
Finally, the ad hoc approach has high administrative costs,
regardless of the specific formulation used. Under this approach,
courts must carefully examine the facts of each case rather than
employ a "cutoff' for what constitutes anticipation of litigation in
the insurance context. This fact-specific examination will inevi-
tably yield high administrative costs.
D. Side Effects
At first glance, the denial presumption appears to have a
troublesome side effect: Affording work product protection only to
portions of the claim file generated after the claim is denied
might prompt insurers to deny a claim early, and then investi-
gate whether the denial was appropriate, all the while under the
shield of work product protection. Given the possibility of an al-
legation of bad faith, however, insurers are unlikely to respond to
the denial presumption rule in this way. If the claim file is sparse
6 The administrative costs of the denial presumption and the broad protection rule
are low for the insurers as well. Insurers under these rules can accurately predict
whether their preparation would have to be shared. Compare Upjohn Co v United States,
449 US 383, 393 (1981) ("An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all.").
" Administrative costs for insurers under the direction of counsel rule are high as
well, because they will face uncertainty regarding what courts will consider to be "direc-
tion of counsel," and will struggle to predict what work will be protected.
" In this case, administrative costs for insurers rise as well, because they will not
know with certainty whether a document they have prepared is in the "ordinary course of
business."
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at the time of the denial, the insured has a strong claim that the
insurer acted in bad faith. The availability of a cause of action
thus discourages insurers from reacting to the denial presump-
tion by denying claims prematurely, with the result that the side
effects of the denial presumption remain low.
In contrast, the other approaches to the work product doc-
trine generate a variety of potentially costly side effects. The ad
hoc approach will give rise to side effects if insurers alter their
behavior in the hopes of falling within the rule. For example, in-
surers may try to appear as though they are anticipating litiga-
tion by involving senior personnel or legal staff in the investiga-
tion of the claim, or by generating "I'm suspicious about this
claim" memos.
Unlike the ad hoc approach, the broad protection approach
generates no potential side effects related to undesirable altera-
tions in insurer behavior to comply with the rule, because virtu-
ally everything is already protected. The lack of access to claim
files, however, may have the troublesome side effect of discour-
aging suits against insurers, leaving insurers unaccountable.
The ordinary course of business approach yields two types of
potential side effects. First, insurers may attempt to make claim
investigations seem extraordinary so as to fall outside the excep-
tion. Such behavior would cause unnecessary expense and delay
in the resolution of claims. Second, undesirable side effects may
arise from the growing sense in the legal community that in the
insurance context and elsewhere, the ordinary course of business
approach is incompatible with the rule's protection of materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation.72
The direction of counsel approach has very high side effects.
First, a rule that shields only preparation done at the direction of
counsel is likely to encourage insurers to rely more heavily on at-
torneys, even for tasks that nonattorneys can perform, increasing
the cost of insurance with little coincident social gain. Second,
judicial reliance on this approach in the insurance context is in-
consistent with the application of the "anticipation of litigation"
requirement in other contexts, where courts have not found di-
rection of counsel to be a critical element.7" This lack of coherence
in the law may lead to social costs because of both uncertainty
See, for example, Thomas Wilson, Note, The Work Product Doctrine: Why Have an
Ordinary Course of Business Exception?, 1988 Colum Bus L Rev 587, 600 (arguing that, in
contrast to judicial determinations that materials prepared in the ordinary course of
business are necessarily not in anticipation of litigation, the two are not mutually exclu-
sive).
See note 62.
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among the parties and decreased confidence in the law due to its
apparent inconsistency.
E. The Impact of a Possible Allegation of Bad Faith
The strengths and weaknesses of the five approaches to the
anticipation of litigation requirement may be either magnified or
mitigated when the availability of complaints of bad faith by the
insured against the insurer is considered. The discovery treat-
ment of such allegations may have significant effects on all four
costs of employing the work product doctrine.
The effect of complaints of bad faith on administrative costs
is relatively straightforward. Complaints of bad faith generally
increase costs of judicial administration. For example, a rule may
yield low administrative costs in determining whether the "an-
ticipation of litigation" requirement is met, but may necessitate
high administrative costs when the court must determine
whether an insured's allegation of bad faith gives rise to "sub-
stantial need."
The availability of allegations of bad faith also introduces
two troublesome side effects. In framing substantive and proce-
dural rules to govern complaints of bad faith, courts must seek to
avoid both encouraging spurious charges of bad faith by making
claims of bad faith too attractive to litigants and leaving insurers
unaccountable by making actions for bad faith excessively diffi-
cult to bring. The impact of these side effects will depend on
whether an allegation of bad faith automatically establishes sub-
stantial need and on the "anticipation of litigation" threshold.
The effect of potential complaints of bad faith on divergence
and missed sharing costs is more complicated. Materials that are
considered for the substantial need exception have already been
deemed to have been prepared in anticipation of litigation. To the
extent that the insurer's decision to undertake preparation de-
pends on the sharing/no sharing rule, whether or not a bad faith
allegation is considered to establish substantial need and neces-
sitate sharing will determine whether such preparation will be
done. The usual presumption is that a sharing rule will discour-
age preparation. 4
The usual presumption does not necessarily hold in this con-
text, however. The fear of sharing a claim file in an action for bad
faith will not discourage an insurance company's preparation. On
the contrary, an insurer is likely to do more. An insurer knows
that if he does little work on a claim, and the court allows discov-
" See note 46 and accompanying text.
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ery of the claim file, the plaintiff could use the insurer's minimal
efforts as evidence that the insurer lacked a rational basis for
denying the claim, giving rise to potential bad faith liability.75
Thus, the knowledge that sharing might be required in an action
for bad faith could lead insurers to do more preparation, not less.
A sharing rule may actually encourage preparation by the in-
surer if he believes such preparation will protect him from bad
faith liability.76 At the very least, the threat of a complaint of bad
faith mitigates concerns that a sharing rule will discourage
preparation, and escalates concerns that a no sharing rule will
lead to missed sharing costs.
F. The Effect of a Possible Complaint of Bad Faith on the Costs
of the Courts' Five Approaches
The possibility of a complaint of bad faith may affect the
costs generated by the five approaches to anticipation of litiga-
tion. For some approaches, allowing an automatic establishment
of substantial need upon an allegation of bad faith is less costly;
for other approaches, refusing such an establishment is prefer-
able. Accordingly, the costs generated by the possibility of a claim
of bad faith vary significantly depending on the underlying ap-
proach to anticipation of litigation.
For the denial presumption approach, the primary purpose
formulation of the ad hoc approach, and the ordinary course of
business approach, costs do not increase significantly when the
court considers a claim of bad faith. Each of these approaches
allows the bad faith question to be handled with limited adminis-
trative costs. These approaches also limit two potential side ef-
fects: encouraging spurious complaints of bad faith and leaving
insurers unaccountable by overdeterring allegations of bad faith.
These approaches limit administrative costs and side effects
at the substantial need stage because the information most im-
portant to parties alleging bad faith is already subject to discov-
ery at the anticipation of litigation stage. For a first party com-
plaint of bad faith, the most relevant portions of the claim file are
those revealing insurer behavior prior to denial of the claim.77
Under each of these three approaches, most pre-denial informa-
' See note 35.
76 This reasoning does not apply to preparation contemplated by the insurer during
time periods not pertinent to an allegation of bad faith. During such time periods, the
threat of an allegation of bad faith has no deterrent effect and the usual assumption that
a sharing rule could discourage preparation is more likely to hold.
' This result occurs because the claim is usually one of bad faith denial, for which the
insurer's pre-denial investigation is most relevant. See note 35.
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tion will be deemed not to have been prepared in anticipation of
litigation, and will be discoverable regardless of whether the in-
sured brings a claim of bad faith. Under the denial presumption
approach, the insured will have access to all pre-denial informa-
tion at the anticipation of litigation stage. Under the primary
purpose formulation of the ad hoc approach, the insured will
have access to most pre-denial preparation, because these docu-
ments are most likely for purposes of making the claim decision
rather than for purposes of litigation. Finally, under the ordinary
course of business approach, the insured will have access to most
pre-denial information, which generally falls under the ordinary
course of business classification.
Because these approaches grant generous discovery at the
anticipation of litigation stage, courts should not automatically
allow a party who claims bad faith access to additional informa-
tion. By such a refusal, courts avoid both potential side effects.
Plaintiffs will already have enough of the claim file to assess
whether the insurer has acted in bad faith and to hold the in-
surer accountable. In addition, because a complaint of bad faith
will not afford an automatic discovery advantage, plaintiffs will
have no incentive to make meritless allegations of bad faith.
The refusal to allow an allegation of bad faith to satisfy the
substantial need and undue hardship exception automatically
limits administrative costs of these approaches at the substantial
need stage as well. A plaintiff is always free to undertake a direct
demonstration of substantial need. Because most of what a
claimant of bad faith needs is discoverable at the anticipation of
litigation stage, however, such showings of substantial need will
be relatively uncommon.78
The broad protection approach, direction of counsel ap-
proach, and substantial prospect of litigation formulation of the
ad hoc approach handle the issue of bad faith less effectively
than the above approaches. Each of these approaches leads to
significant additional costs when the possibility of a claim of bad
faith is considered, primarily because what is shared at the an-
ticipation of litigation stage may not be what a party who makes
a claim of bad faith needs. Costly adjustment at the substantial
need stage may therefore be necessary.
Consider first the impact of potential complaints of bad faith
under the broad protection rule. According to this approach, an
' See, for example, Squealer Feeds v Pickering, 530 NW2d 678, 688 (Iowa 1995)
(finding that where insured had access to pre-denial materials, substantial need for post-
denial materials had not been demonstrated).
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insured is denied access to materials relating to even the most
routine investigations by the insurer. Because the whole file is
protected, demonstrating substantial need is the only way to ob-
tain any of the file. Without access to any of the insurer's file, it
may be extremely difficult for a plaintiff ever to establish a com-
plaint of bad faith against an insurer. 9 Thus, the broad protec-
tion rule may have the troublesome side effect of overdeterring
valid complaints of bad faith. Unfortunately, the obvious solution
of allowing an allegation of bad faith to establish substantial
need automatically would generate side effects. Adopting an ap-
proach that yields automatic sharing for causes of action alleging
bad faith but no sharing for other causes of action-such as re-
covering on a policy contract-is likely to encourage plaintiffs to
bring frivolous complaints of bad faith strategically in order to
get an advantage during discovery.80 Regardless of whether a
claim of bad faith establishes substantial need, such a complaint
increases administrative costs under the broad protection ap-
proach. The court must either determine which parts of the file
become automatically accessible as a result of the complaint of
bad faith or conduct a case-specific "substantial need" inquiry.81
The direction of counsel rule also threatens to yield substan-
tial costs when an allegation of bad faith is raised. This approach
may leave insurers unaccountable because they could involve
counsel at an early stage, thereby protecting most of the claim
file. Courts might counteract this undesirable side effect by
holding that an allegation of bad faith alone conclusively estab-
lishes substantial need. As with the broad protection approach,
however, this bright-line rule will increase the number of frivo-
lous allegations of bad faith, will produce significant administra-
tive costs, and will decrease insurers' ability to predict what will
be protected.
The substantial prospect of litigation formulation of the ad
hoc approach raises similar concerns about increased social costs.
While the insured automatically gains access to the parts of the
claim file prepared when litigation was not a substantial pros-
pect, the complaint of bad faith may well turn on the insurer's
See Holmgren v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 976 F2d 573, 576-78
(9th Cir 1992); Tackett v State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Co, 653 A2d 254, 261-
62 (Del 1995).
The plaintiffs' motives may not be wholly improper: without an allegation of bad
faith, the insured has minimal access to the claim file, and may honestly-but wrongly-
believe he has a valid action for bad faith.
" The bad faith issue also increases administrative costs for the insurer. Although
the insurer may expect that a broad protection rule will protect the entire file, the risk of
discoverability in a bad faith action reduces the certainty of that protection.
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behavior after litigation became a substantial prospect and be-
fore the claim was denied. Hence, courts might be tempted to al-
low a plaintiff to qualify for the substantial need exception auto-
matically in order to ensure that complaints of bad faith are not
systematically disadvantaged. But as previously demonstrated
with the broad protection and direction of counsel approaches,
this strategy would lead to an increased number of allegations of
bad faith and to increased administrative costs.
G. The Best Approach: Denial Presumption
The table below summarizes the social costs generated by
each of the available judicial interpretations of the work product
doctrine. For each approach to the "anticipation of litigation" re-
quirement, the table represents the costs the approach generates
if discovery requests in actions for bad faith are handled in the
least costly way. Because the possibility of complaints of bad
faith may yield increased administrative costs and side effects,
these costs are separated into those incurred at the anticipation
of litigation stage and those generated in conjunction with the
bad faith issue.
Divergence Missed Administrative Side Effects
Costs Sharing Costs
Costs
Ordinary Course AOL: Medium AOL: High
of Business Ex- Medium Low
ception BF: Low BF: Low
Broad Protection AOL: Low AOL: Medium
Approach Low Very High
BF: High BF: Very High
Direction of AOL: Medium AOL: Very High
Counsel Medium Medium
Approach BF: High BF: HiEh
Denial AOL: Low AOL: Low
Presumption Medium Low
BF: Low BF: Low
Ad Hoc Approach: AOL: High AOL: Medium
Primary Purpose Medium Medium
Formulation BF: Low BF: Low
Ad Hoc Approach: AOL: High AOL: Medium
Substantial Low High
Prospect BF: Medium BF: High
Formulation
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While necessarily crude, this summary indicates that the
denial presumption rule is the best approach. No strategy outper-
forms it in terms of administrative costs and side effects. While
the broad protection and substantial prospect approaches have
lower divergence costs than the denial presumption, each of
these has substantially higher costs of other kinds. Thus, when
all costs of each approach are aggregated and compared, the de-
nial presumption approach comes out on top.82
In addition to suggesting the least costly interpretation of
the work product doctrine, this analysis confirms the importance
of considering the anticipation of litigation and bad faith issues
simultaneously. As discussed above, if the denial presumption
approach is used, the optimal rule holds that a plaintiff may not
show substantial need based on a bare allegation of bad faith."
Under such an approach, there is no difference between what is
discoverable when a plaintiff includes a complaint of bad faith
and when he does not. Consequently, courts will generally have
few administrative costs beyond the original "anticipation of liti-
gation" determination, and insurers will be able to predict with
reasonable accuracy what sort of documents will have to be
shared. Plaintiffs will have little to gain by including an allega-
tion of bad faith, and thus will not file spurious claims.
At the same time, the possibility of an allegation of bad faith
will discourage insurers from prematurely denying claims in an
effort to shield their materials from discovery and frustrate the
sharing rule.' The possibility of complaints of bad faith may also
decrease divergence costs resulting from discouraged pre-denial
preparation, because insurers are less likely to underprepare if
they fear their lack of preparation will come back to haunt them
in the form of a complaint of bad faith." Moreover, the possibility
of a complaint of bad faith is not an empty threat. Given that in-
sureds already have access to a significant part of the file, they
should have enough information to evaluate whether the insurer
"Somewhat surprisingly, the ordinary course of business approach offers the next
best solution. This outcome conflicts with the common view that the ordinary course of
business exception does not really make sense in the insurance context, where many ma-
terials are prepared both in the ordinary course of business and in anticipation of litiga-
tion. See, for example, Wilson, Note, 1988 Colun Bus L Rev at 600 (cited in note 72);
Stokes, 34 Baylor L Rev at 165 (cited in note 63). As discussed, this intellectual discom-
fort with the doctrine is reflected in the high general side effects. See Part IV.D. Apart
from the side effects, however, the ordinary course of business exception performs well. In
other words, while the test itself is somewhat unattractive, the resulting pattern of pro-
tection is quite tolerable in the insurance context.
See Part IV.F.
See Part IV.D.
See Part IV.E. See also note 61 and accompanying text.
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acted in bad faith and to bring suit if warranted." Hence, insur-
ers will not be left unaccountable.
To maintain the advantages of the denial presumption ap-
proach best, courts should allow an insurer to overcome the pre-
sumption that a pre-denial document is subject to discovery only
if the insurer can show that its primary purpose in preparing the
document was for litigation. Further, courts should construe the
primary purpose test to require a demonstration that the insurer
did not use the document to make the claim decision. 7 A strictly
applied test will make it difficult for the insurer to win protection
for pre-denial material, but at the same time, it will allow an in-
surer to protect materials clearly geared toward trial that just
happened to be prepared before denial of the contested claim. 8
Because the presumption would be difficult to overcome, insurers
will rarely attempt to do so, limiting costs of judicial administra-
tion. Similarly, the insured could overcome the presumption that
post-denial material is protected by demonstrating that the pri-
mary purpose of the material was not litigation.s9
CONCLUSION
In formulating a sharing rule in insurance cases, courts
should seek to encourage the optimal amount of trial preparation
by insurers. To do so, judges must be sensitive to how insurers'
incentives to prepare may diverge from society's desired level,
and how the interpretation of the work product doctrine affects
this divergence. Courts should be sensitive to the divergence
costs, missed sharing costs, administrative costs, and side effects
that accompany any interpretation of the work product doctrine.
Courts should realize that the "anticipation of litigation" re-
quirement and the treatment of discovery requests in actions for
bad faith are interdependent. A meaningful treatment of either
issue requires consideration of the other. For cases involving first
party insurance, the best strategy utilizes a presumption that an
insurer's preparations are in anticipation of litigation only after a
See Part V.F.
8 Such a test thus presumes that an insurer's primary purpose in preparing any pre-
denial document useful to the claim decision was to assist in making the claim decision.
This approach is slightly more generous than the Harper rule, which requires a
demonstration that litigation was reasonably expected when the document was produced,
and that the document was prepared and used solely for litigation. See text accompanying
note 30; 138 FRD at 663-64.
Overcoming the presumption in this direction is also quite difficult. Trying to dem-
onstrate substantial need may be more fruitful for insureds than trying to overcome this
presumption.
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claim is denied, along with a rule that an allegation of bad faith,
without more, does not overcome work product protection.
6
